Psychological research indicates that suicide attackers are neither mentally disturbed nor motivated primarily by theology (Merari 2004, Kruglanski 2002, Hassan 2001).
Religious radicals will be active when government provision of public good is weak and when nonmilitia market opportunities are poor
The club model implies that subsidies to militias can be dramatically increase not only militia activity but also the intensity of prohibitions
A government which seeks to reduce militia activity and increase attrition from militias could:
Block transfers to clubs operating militias
Improve alternative provision of local public goods accessible to both members and non members
Reduce smuggling rents and other rents that clubs operating militias can aspire to capture
Improve outside options
References:
Becker, G.S. (1968). Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 76(2), 169-217. March.
Berman, E., Laitin, D.D. (2008). Religion, terrorism and public goods: testing the club model. National Bureau of Economic Research WP#13725. January.
Hassan, N. (2001). An arsenal of believers: talking to the ‘human bombs’. New Yorker, November 19.
Kruglanski, A. (2002). Inside the terrorist mind. National Academy of Sciences presentation, April.
Pape, R.A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. American Political Review 97.
Pape, R.A. (2005) Dying to Wind. Ra Dom House, New York.
Merari, A. (2004). Suicide terrorism in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. National Institute of Justice Suicide Terrorism Conference, October 25-26, Washington, DC.
