Notes on "Bailing out the Banks: Reconciling Stability and Competition An analysis of state-supported schemes for financial institutions"

Bailing out the Banks: Reconciling Stability and Competition An analysis of state-supported schemes for financial institutions
Thorsten Beck (Tilburg University and CEPR) 
Diane Coyle (Enlightenment Economics, University of Manchester and CEPR) 
Mathias Dewatripont (Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School, ECARES and CEPR) Xavier Freixas (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR) 
Paul Seabright (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR)

Financial regulation:
Stabilize the financial system
Restart lending
One for all does not work
Stability should be measured by real terms instead of accounting terms

Competition policy:
Avoid distortions of competition
Conditions on bailouts should vary according to the banks' specific characteristics

(not finished)

Notes on "Need cash? Look into your company" (Kaiser and Young)

Need cash? Look into your company

Kaiser and Young

Harvard Business Review

Do not tie receivables to payables
Do not apply current / quick ratios
Overemphasis on quality
Don’t benchmark only with industry competitors
Don’t reward the sales force for growth alone
Don’t manage via income statements only

Notes on "Khaneman and Tversky (1979)"

Risk aversion in the positive domain is accompanied by risk seeking in the negative domain

Notes on "A Strategic Perspective on Bankruptcy" (Bill George, Andrew N. McLean)

A Strategic Perspective on Bankruptcy
Bill George, Andrew N. McLean
Harvard Business School, April 11, 2007

Bankruptcy -> restructuring
"take-it-or-get-nothing": a powerful bargaining tool
uncertainty of market movements leads to uncertainty of restructuring
out-of-court: less expensive, higher challenges
court-supervised: extraordinary demands are placed on management, easier access to finance
social cost of restructuring via bankruptcy